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In his first description of Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD), Kanner emphasized emotional
impairments by characterizing children with ASD as indifferent to other people, self-
absorbed, emotionally cold, distanced, and retracted. Thereafter, emotional impairments
became regarded as part of the social impairments of ASD, and research mostly focused
on understanding how individuals with ASD recognize visual expressions of emotions from
faces and body postures. However, it still remains unclear how emotions are processed
outside of the visual domain. This systematic review aims to fill this gap by focusing
on impairments of emotional language processing in ASD. We systematically searched
PubMed for papers published between 1990 and 2013 using standardized search terms.
Studies show that people with ASD are able to correctly classify emotional language stimuli
as emotionally positive or negative. However, processing of emotional language stimuli
in ASD is associated with atypical patterns of attention and memory performance, as
well as abnormal physiological and neural activity. Particularly, younger children with ASD
have difficulties in acquiring and developing emotional concepts, and avoid using these in
discourse. These emotional language impairments were not consistently associated with
age, IQ, or level of development of language skills. We discuss how emotional language
impairments fit with existing cognitive theories of ASD, such as central coherence,
executive dysfunction, and weak Theory of Mind. We conclude that emotional impairments
in ASD may be broader than just a mere consequence of social impairments, and should
receive more attention in future research.
Keywords: autism spectrum disorders, asperger syndrome, social, emotion, affect, language
INTRODUCTION
Autism spectrum disorder (ASD) is characterized by persistent
impairments in social communication and interaction, restricted
and repetitive behavior, and an onset of the disorder in early
childhood (APA, 2013). While ASD was divided into subtypes in
previous versions of the diagnostic and statistical manual of men-
tal disorders (DSM), different forms of ASD are now combined in
one broad category in the new DSM-5 (APA, 2013).
Clinically important diagnostic characteristics of ASD include
lack of spontaneous seeking to share enjoyment, emotions,
affect, interests, or achievements with other people, and a lack
of emotional reciprocity. In his original description of autism,
Abbreviations: ABC, Autism Behavior Checklist; ADI, Autism Diagnostic
Interview; ADOS, Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule; AS, Asperger
syndrome; ASD, Autism Spectrum Disorder; ASDS, Asperger Syndrome Diag-
nostic Scale; CA, chronological age; CARS, Childhood Autism Rating Scale;
DD, developmental delay; DS, Down syndrome; LFA, low-functioning autism;
MA, mental age; NVIQ, nonverbal intelligence quotient; NVMA, nonverbal
mental age; PDD, Pervasive Developmental Disorder; PIQ, Performance intel-
ligence quotient; TD, typically developing; VIQ, verbal intelligence quotient;
VMA, verbal mental age; WS, Williams syndrome.
Kanner (1943) already emphasized the presence of emotional
impairments, and characterized the patients as indifferent to
other people, self-absorbed, emotionally cold, distanced, and
retracted. However in the later years these emotional impairments
were shifted to the background and were considered to be just a
part of the core social deficits (Ritvo and Freeman, 1977; Rutter,
1978; Denckla, 1986; Fein et al., 1986). Most studies of emotion
processing in ASD focused on facial emotion recognition (Jemel
et al., 2006; Harms et al., 2010; Uljarevic and Hamilton, 2013).
A recent meta-analysis concluded that facial emotion recogni-
tion is indeed impaired in the ASD population, although there
is considerable variability between studies and the true effect
size is probably much smaller due to publication bias (Uljare-
vic and Hamilton, 2013). However, the evidence from studies
with facial stimuli alone is not sufficient to draw conclusions
about the severity and extent of emotional impairments in ASD.
The reason is that individuals with ASD have problems with
processing faces in general, not restricted to only emotional
faces (Jemel et al., 2006; Harms et al., 2010). In contrast to
typical individuals, individuals with ASD do not spontaneously
pay attention to faces, ignore the eye region and focus on less
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significant parts of the face (Jemel et al., 2006; Wolf et al., 2008;
Senju and Johnson, 2009). So, even in studies that do report
main group effects in facial emotion recognition, it is unclear
whether the differences should be explained by a more specific
emotional impairment, or by more general problems in face
processing.
Comparatively little attention has been paid in research
in ASD to processing of other types of emotional stimuli,
such as emotional language (understanding of emotion-laden
words, sentences and text; talking about emotions; percep-
tion and production of emotional intonation in speech). In
fact, a lack of research on emotion processing in non-social
tasks has been pointed out in earlier reviews (Gaigg, 2012;
Nuske et al., 2013). If more generic emotional impairments
exist in people with ASD that cause facial emotion processing
deficits, we would expect to observe emotional impairments
in language as well. The aim of this article is to provide a
systematic review of the empirical literature with respect to
emotional language in ASD, discuss the implications for our
understanding of ASD, and give recommendations for future
research.
In discussing emotional language in ASD it is important to
keep in mind that many people with ASD have problems in
language development and impairment in verbal and nonverbal
communication. Phenotypically, most people with ASD have
semantic, syntactic and pragmatic deficits, and a smaller number
are known to have phonological deficits (Groen et al., 2008).
On the most high-functioning end of the autism spectrum,
people have no apparent language delay and normal to high
verbal IQ with only minor difficulties with respect to prag-
matic language use. In contrast, individuals on the most low-
functioning end never develop any language at all. The majority
of people with ASD range between these two extremes. This
variation in verbal ability can be a major confound. Possible
ways to deal with it include: (1) comparing high-functioning
people with ASD to healthy controls matched on verbal IQ;
(2) comparing people with ASD to other clinical groups with
a similar level of language problems (for example, suffering
from dyslexia or specific language impairment); and (3) includ-
ing participants with a wide range of verbal abilities and test-
ing if correcting for verbal IQ causes the effect of emotion to
disappear.
AIM
There is an evident lack of knowledge on how individuals with
ASD process non-facial emotional stimuli, such as language. This
paper aims to fill this gap by providing a systematic review of emo-
tional impairments in ASD with a primary focus on emotional
language. We will address the following questions:
1. Is there evidence for emotional impairments in the language
domain? Is it present in different experimental paradigms?
Does it depend on modality, such as visual (i.e., reading
words and texts) or auditory channel (i.e., listening to words
and sentences), and/or on complexity of information: simple
(single words) vs. complex (sentences and discourse)? Does it
affect primarily implicit measures (which the participant is not
aware of or is not able to exert conscious control: difference in
memory performance, error rates, physiological responses) or
explicit processing of emotion (valence rating, verbal report)?
2. Does the degree of emotional language impairments in ASD
individuals correlate with their clinical characteristics, such as
the severity of cognitive and clinical linguistic impairments? If
emotional impairments are caused by a linguistic or cognitive
impairment, one would expect emotional impairments to be
present more often and with greater severity in individuals
with lower verbal or nonverbal IQ and a history of intellectual
and language delay. In addition, IQ then would be negatively
correlated with the severity of emotional impairments.
3. How do emotional language impairments fit within exist-
ing cognitive theories of ASD, such as the central coherence
impairment, executive dysfunction, Theory of Mind account,
and impairment of the mirror neuron system (MNS)? We will
also explore whether the concept of alexithymia and moti-
vational factors related to reward and punishment learning
provide useful theoretical accounts of emotional language
impairments in subjects with ASD.
METHODS
To identify relevant articles, we systematically searched PubMed
and Google Scholar for papers published from 1980 onwards
using the following search terms: #1 autism OR autistic OR
Asperger OR ASD; #2 emotion∗ OR affect OR feeling; #3 #1 AND
#2. We selected all original studies that compared the performance
of a group of people diagnosed with ASD with controls on an
emotion-related measure. Additionally, we manually searched the
reference lists of these papers, and checked (using Google Scholar)
all articles that were cited in the articles we selected.
Articles were included in our systematic review if they satisfied
the following criteria:
– inclusion of participants with ASD diagnosed according to the
official DSM or international classification of diseases (ICD)
criteria;
– inclusion of at least one control group without ASD;
– the groups were compared with respect to their performance
on an emotion-related measure, and either considered emo-
tionally laden stimuli as an independent variable (such as emo-
tional words, sentences or prosody) or studied the spontaneous
production of emotionally loaded reactions (such as referring
to one’s own or another person’s emotional state).
We excluded studies focusing on the processing of facial
expressions of emotions, because these have been extensively
reviewed elsewhere (Jemel et al., 2006; Harms et al., 2010), as well
as intervention and drug studies. If the study measured multiple
variables, performance on facial emotion recognition was not
reviewed but other relevant outcomes were reported in the review.
Thus, in contrast to other reviews, we focused exclusively on
studies of relatively abstract emotional representations. At the
end, we retrieved 33 studies with verbal/linguistic stimuli to be
discussed in this review. A summary of all papers can be found
in Table 1 including details on the ASD and control groups
and the tasks administered. The studies retrieved vary with 8
reporting on emotional processing in children, 15 in adolescents,
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and 10 in adults with ASD. Nineteen/thirty three (57 percent)
of the studies used formal research instruments autism diagnos-
tic interview (ADI) or autism diagnostic observation schedule
(ADOS) to confirm clinical diagnosis. Other diagnostic instru-
ments included Autism Behavior Checklist (Volkmar et al., 1988),
Asperger syndrome diagnostic scale (Goldstein, 2002), childhood
autism rating scale (Schopler et al., 1980; Rellini et al., 2004),
social communication questionnaire (Chandler et al., 2007), and
others. Sample sizes for most studies were rather small (on
average 18 participants in the ASD group, ranging from 6–37
participants) with only 12 (1/3) studies reporting about sample
sizes larger than 20. Twenty-five studies included higher func-
tioning subjects with ASD, whereas 8 studies investigated lower
functioning participants. Seventeen studies did match ASD and
control group on age and verbal/nonverbal IQ, but in 5 studies
the groups significantly differed on IQ scores, 6 studies did not
provide IQ scores for the control group, and 5 studies included
multiple control groups partially matched on chronological age,
mental age and IQ.
IS THERE EVIDENCE FOR EMOTIONAL IMPAIRMENT
IN EMOTIONAL LANGUAGE?
First, we addressed the question of whether abnormalities in
emotional language processing are specific to particular cognitive
domains, or are more general, i.e., independent of the type of
information involved. In the next section, we group all articles in
terms of the cognitive task used.
COMPARISON OF DIFFERENT TASKS
Emotional language has been investigated in a variety of tasks
including recognition and recall, stimulus detection, and dis-
course and reasoning.
Typically developing people remember emotion laden words
and sentences better than neutral stimuli (Dolcos et al., 2004).
Some reports indicate that this is not the case for subjects with
ASD. In one study, participants listened to and had to memo-
rize neutral and emotional sentences, among other conditions
(Beversdorf et al., 1998). Memory performance did not differ
between ASD and control participants on scrambled word lists,
neutral sentences, sentences which made a coherent story together
with other sentences from the list, and sentences describing
other people’s mental states and perspectives. The only difference
between the two groups was on recall of emotional sentences
where typical participants showed better performance compared
to other conditions, while ASD subjects did not (Beversdorf et al.,
1998). A similar finding was obtained in studies with visually pre-
sented single words (Kennedy et al., 2006; Gaigg and Bowler, 2008,
2009b). Control participants showed better recognition memory
for emotional words compared to neutral words, had better recall
rates for emotion words over a 24 h period, and were less likely
to falsely recall them in an illusory memory paradigm. In ASD
subjects, however, those effects were significantly diminished. The
current view is that typical people remember emotional stimuli
better because they perceive these stimuli as potentially motiva-
tionally significant and allocate additional processing resources.
This process is subserved by medial temporal lobe structures
and results in better encoding and retrieval (Dolcos et al., 2004).
Lack of emotional memory effect in the ASD participants can
mean that they either did not perceive the emotional words
or sentences as more salient and motivationally relevant, or
failed to efficiently encode them because of an impairment at a
later processing stage. In contrast, another study did not find a
difference in memory performance for emotion words between
ASD and typical participants (South et al., 2008). In this study
participants read word lists and were then immediately tested
for recognition memory. This result suggests that the differences
between the ASD and typical groups on emotional memory could
be dependent on time and could be less prominent at immediate
recall/recognition.
Subjects with ASD also display abnormalities in their auto-
matic attentional reaction to emotionally salient stimuli. In an
attentional blink paradigm, subjects were asked to read words
in a rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) stream and detect
target words printed in a red color (Gaigg and Bowler, 2009a).
Normally, the probability of successfully detecting a target word
depends on the time interval between the presentation of the
preceding target word (T1) and the current target word (T2).
If the T1 was presented just before the T2, then at the time
the T2 is presented most of the attention resources are still
engaged in processing the T1, and therefore the probability of
successfully detecting T2 significantly drops (“attentional blink”
effect). However, this attentional blink phenomenon does not
occur with emotional words, which are detected with high accu-
racy irrespective of the timing. This emotional modulation of
attentional blink is thought to be a result of emotion words
being perceived as more salient and motivationally relevant and
thus receiving more attentional resources, primarily because if
the involvement of the amygdala in detecting of emotional words
(Anderson and Phelps, 2001). In two studies, the predicted mod-
ulation of attentional blink by T2 valence was found in controls,
but not in ASD. In the ASD group, the detection rates of neu-
tral and emotional T2s were not statistically different (Corden
et al., 2008; Gaigg and Bowler, 2009a). This result suggests that
individuals with ASD do not perceive emotional words as more
salient, suggesting an impairment in the amygdala functioning
or in the connectivity between the amygdala, cingulate cortex
and frontal cortical areas in the ASD group (Gaigg and Bowler,
2009a).
Studies of reasoning about emotions expressed in discourse
also showed differences between ASD and control individuals.
One study investigated children’s responses in a structured con-
versation. This study found that children with Asperger syn-
drome more frequently gave inadequate or no response when
talking about an emotional topic compared to a neutral one
(Adams et al., 2002). Two more studies investigated emotion
word use during telling a story about a fictional or real event.
They found that children with ASD talked significantly less about
emotions, desires and beliefs compared to typically developing
control children. Children with ASD also less frequently referred
to emotional states as a cause of one’s action (compared to
TD group), although both groups talked equally often about
causes for physical events (Capps et al., 2000; Losh and Capps,
2006). Similar results were obtained in a study which asked
adult participants to watch a film clip displaying interactions
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between people. Adults with ASD were less likely than controls
to include the characters’ emotional state in the description
or explanation of their behavior (Barnes et al., 2009). Overall
these findings show that individuals with ASD have problems
with processing and handling emotional language in memory
paradigms, automatic information processing, and in discourse
and reasoning.
COMPREHENSION VS. PRODUCTION TASKS
There is debate on whether or not subjects with ASD have
abnormal profiles of production and comprehension of lan-
guage. Some studies find better production than comprehension
in children with ASD for language in general (Hudry et al.,
2010b; Miniscalco et al., 2012) while other studies report a more
uniform profile of language development (Jarrold et al., 1997).
Three of the studies reviewed here used the PEPS-C prosody test
which consists of perception and production subtests, including
affective prosody; all of these studies showed deficits in both
perception and production subtests (Peppé et al., 2007; Järvinen-
Pasley et al., 2008; Hesling et al., 2010). In spontaneous dialog
or interview, participants from the ASD group were less likely
to mention emotions, describe emotional states (Tager-Flusberg,
1992; Adams et al., 2002; Müller and Schuler, 2006), or use
emotional state for a causal explanation of characters’ actions
(Capps et al., 2000; Pearlman-Avnion and Eviatar, 2002; Brown
et al., 2012). In some studies, this neglect was specific to emotions
and not present when talking about other types of events (Losh
and Capps, 2006); however, one study found no group differences
between ASD and typically developing children (Bang et al.,
2012).
In all, the data suggest that emotion language impairments are
present in both production and comprehension modes. There is
no evidence for an imbalance between production and compre-
hension emotion language skills in ASD.
MODALITY: VISUAL VS. AUDITORY
Auditorily presented speech unfolds over time, so participants
need to continuously pay attention; it is also not possible to go
back and listen to parts of it again if something was missed or
misheard. Analysis of auditory stimuli also starts earlier, with
semantic analysis being made on the basis of partial information
before the presentation of the word ends, which results in an
earlier onset of semantic ERP effects (Holcomb and Neville,
1990). Previous studies have reported that auditory stimuli com-
pared to visual also elicit stronger behavioral effects: larger and
more robust effects of semantic priming and semantic expectancy
on reaction times and accuracy (Holcomb and Neville, 1990;
Holcomb et al., 1992), as well as greater amplitude and earlier
onset of electrophysiological brain responses (Holcomb et al.,
1992; Niznikiewicz et al., 1997). This means that visual tasks
can be potentially less sensitive and require larger samples
to have sufficient power to detect a difference between ASD
and control groups. Processing of auditory stimuli compared
to visual is also affected by timing of word presentation to
a much greater degree (Anderson and Holcomb, 1995), and
follows a different developmental trajectory (Holcomb et al.,
1992).
From the studies that investigated perception of emotional
language, 8 studies presented the stimuli visually (Kennedy et al.,
2006; Corden et al., 2008; Gaigg and Bowler, 2008; Mason
et al., 2008; South et al., 2008; Gaigg and Bowler, 2009a,b; Han
et al., 2014) and 11 studies auditorily (Beversdorf et al., 1998;
Boucher et al., 2000; Lindner and Rosén, 2006; Korpilahti et al.,
2007; Peppé et al., 2007; Järvinen-Pasley et al., 2008; Volden
and Sorenson, 2009; Grossman et al., 2010; Hesling et al., 2010;
Kuchinke et al., 2011; Eigsti et al., 2012). In the 11 studies
that used auditory modality, 8 studies used explicit measures
(participants were asked to identify the expressed emotion), and
only one study investigated implicit behavioral measures (mem-
ory performance, Beversdorf et al., 1998). In contrast, 7 out
of 8 studies using visually presented stimuli looked at implicit
measures: reaction time, stimulus detection rate, memory perfor-
mance, while only three used explicit measures: rating emotional
arousal of words on a scale (Corden et al., 2008; Gaigg and
Bowler, 2008) or detecting emotionally negative words among
neutral (Han et al., 2014). The fact that visual and auditory
stimuli were used in different paradigms makes it difficult to
assess whether the modality in which the stimulus is presented
makes a difference. Explicit measures in studies with auditorily
presented stimuli were more likely to show a group difference
compared to studies with visual stimuli, suggesting that the
transient nature of the auditory signal may indeed make the
task more difficult for the ASD group. However, because of the
small number of studies we can’t draw a definite conclusion.
Future studies could address this issue by using visual and audi-
tory language stimuli in the same participants and the same
task.
COMPLEXITY OF INFORMATION: WORDS VS. SENTENCES
Understanding single words for people with ASD is less problem-
atic than understanding complete sentences and natural speech
(Tager-Flusberg et al., 2005; Williams et al., 2008).
As indicated in the previous section, many studies on the
processing of emotion language have focused on discourse, such
as talking about emotional topics and making inferences about
emotional states (Adams et al., 2002; Losh and Capps, 2006;
Barnes et al., 2009). An alternative explanation could be that
the individuals with autism have difficulties expressing complex
thoughts in general and that problems in reasoning on emotional
topics are not very emotion specific. Therefore, it is important
to note that several studies also found impaired performance
in the ASD group on tasks that involved detecting or remem-
bering single emotional words. The ASD group performed sig-
nificantly worse than non-ASD subjects specifically on memory
for emotional words (Kennedy et al., 2006; Gaigg and Bowler,
2008, 2009b), although the overall memory performance was
similar for ASD and non-ASD subjects. Participants with ASD
had less understanding of emotion-related words, but this was
not the case for abstract non-emotional words (Hobson and Lee,
1989). In another study where participants had to memorize
sentences, participants with ASD showed impaired performance
on emotional sentences, but were just as good as controls in
remembering neutral sentences with social and Theory of Mind
content (Beversdorf et al., 1998). Thus, it was not the case that
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emotional sentences were more difficult for subjects with ASD
because of their relation to social context with which ASD partic-
ipants would be less familiar. In all, it is unlikely that the deficient
performance in processing emotional verbal stimuli in the studies
reviewed above is due to a general effect of stimulus complexity.
EXPLICIT VS. IMPLICIT MEASURES
Some studies used explicit emotion measures to investigate emo-
tion processing in ASD: in those studies participants were asked
to assign the stimuli to a particular category (happy or sad) or
to rate it as positive or negative, or as more or less emotionally
arousing. Other studies applied indirect measures of emotional
processing, such as the effect of emotion on attention or mem-
ory, physiological responses, brain activity, and spontaneous talk
about emotion.
Indirect and implicit measures are problematic, because the
absence of an emotion effect could be due to a deficit outside
the emotional domain, for example, in attention or motivation.
Thus, the absence of an emotion effect in the ASD group should
be interpreted with caution. On the other hand, explicit measures
can also be problematic, especially in subjects with high IQ.
Even though these individuals may have impairments in emo-
tion processing, they can use their analytic abilities to design
alternative strategies to label stimuli as positive or negative. For
example, emotional intonation differs from neutral on a number
of acoustic characteristics such as pitch height and variation
(Bänziger and Scherer, 2005). If individuals with ASD would focus
on isolated features in a prosody perception task, they would be
able to correctly classify stimuli as emotional or neutral, but the
way they process the stimuli still may be fundamentally different
from typical controls, who use a more holistic strategy. Similarly,
in facial emotion recognition studies, distinguishing between
positive and negative emotion can be done based on single feature,
such as upturned or downturned mouth corners, which fits
with some of the studies finding atypical gaze patterns in ASD
(Neumann et al., 2006). Thus, rather normal explicit responses in
the ASD group can only be interpreted in combination with other
measures.
Approximately half of the studies using explicit measures
report differences between ASD and controls. It is important to
consider the difficulty of the applied task. For instance, when
participants were asked to classify the auditorily presented sen-
tences as sad and happy, both groups performed in a similar way
(Grossman et al., 2010). In more difficult tasks, on the other
hand, participants with ASD made more errors than controls:
for example, when they had to choose between four response
options in a task that required identifying emotion in intonation,
(Lindner and Rosén, 2006), or when they had to identify complex
emotions of social nature such as embarrassment or jealousy
(Hillier and Allinson, 2002; Bauminger, 2004; Rieffe et al., 2007).
However, some studies also found lower performance in the ASD
group in a simple 2-alternative choice task between sad and happy
intonation (Peppé et al., 2007; Hesling et al., 2010), suggesting
that the task difficulty should be considered in combination with
age and functioning level of the participants. To conclude, in
certain circumstances participants with ASD have trouble with
fine differentiation between various emotions and perform worse
than control subjects. Unfortunately, all of the studies either
provided participants with response options, or asked to rate
them on one single scale. Potentially, naming the emotion in
a free response task, or rating the stimuli on several scales at
once (for example, valence and arousal) and having to distin-
guish between these different aspects, would be more challenging,
and this kind of task should be more likely to uncover group
differences.
Studies that use implicit measures report strongly variable
findings. Behavioral results are very much dependent on the
task used, and with respect to some tasks, the results are still
preliminary. For example, only 2 studies so far report attenuated
attention blink effect (Corden et al., 2008; Gaigg and Bowler,
2009a), and 4 studies find a weaker effect of emotion on memory
in ASD compared to non-ASD subjects (Beversdorf et al., 1998;
Kennedy et al., 2006; Gaigg and Bowler, 2008, 2009b) but another
study does not (South et al., 2008).
With respect to activity of the autonomic nervous system, the
studies measuring skin conductance response (SCR) modulation
found typical responses during reading emotion words compared
to neutral ones in the ASD group (Corden et al., 2008; Gaigg
and Bowler, 2008). These studies used highly arousing emotional
words, such as profanities, taboo words and sexually explicit
words, and the highly arousing nature of these stimuli could be
the reason why they elicited an autonomic response not only in
typical but also in ASD group. Another study measuring pupillary
response to the stimuli with an intermediate level of emotional
arousal (sentences spoken with positive and negative intonation)
showed increased response to negative stimuli and decreased
response to positive (Kuchinke et al., 2011). This is in agreement
with yet other studies showing absent or reversed responses of the
autonomous nervous system in an anxiety-provoking situation in
people with ASD (Kushki et al., 2013). Due to the small number
of studies and differences in autonomic measures and design, it is
not yet possible to reach a conclusion with respect to physiological
correlates of emotions in ASD, but the preliminary evidence
suggests that participants with ASD may be less sensitive to subtle
variations in emotional valence, while stimuli with high emo-
tional arousal are equally likely to elicit an autonomic response in
ASD and typical population. More research in this field is needed.
Moving now to the studies of brain activity, our selection
included 5 fMRI studies and one EEG study (Korpilahti et al.,
2007). All of them report significant between-group differences
with respect to processing of emotion language at the neural
level. Studies report less deactivation of the default-mode network
regions for visual or auditory emotional stimuli compared to
neutral stimuli or rest in the ASD group (Kennedy et al., 2006;
Hesling et al., 2010), suggesting that individuals with ASD may
have trouble suppressing task-irrelevant regions and focusing on
the relevant stimuli characteristics. The medial prefrontal cortex
(MPFC) was more active during rest than during task perfor-
mance in the typical group, and during task it was more active in
response to emotional compared to neutral words (Kennedy et al.,
2006). However, the ASD group failed to show any modulation
of activity in this region in either of the comparisons. Medial
prefrontal regions have been previously implicated in evaluation
of stimuli as pleasant or unpleasant (Maddock et al., 2003) and in
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silent generation of emotionally positive or negative words (Cato
et al., 2004). A lack of modulation of activity in this area in the
ASD group suggests an impairment in the processes of evaluation,
but it also indicates that people with ASD may engage in different
kinds of cognitive processing during resting state, as indicated
by higher activity in MPFC at rest in typical group compared to
ASD group. Participants with ASD also showed greater activation
in the left supramarginal gyrus (implicated in phonological pro-
cessing) during an auditory task (Hesling et al., 2010), suggesting
that the ASD group focused more on phonological rather than
conceptual features of the input. Furthermore, studies with verbal
stimuli find more activity outside of the language network in the
ASD group: fusiform gyrus (Han et al., 2014), right hemisphere
homologs (Mason et al., 2008; Eigsti et al., 2012), and brain areas
typically involved in memory and control, such as parahippocam-
pal gyrus and globus pallidus (Eigsti et al., 2012). These results
suggest that individuals with ASD recruit a different network of
brain areas during emotional language tasks, which results in less
efficient processing and requires additional involvement of the
homologous regions from the right hemisphere. The EEG study
comparing electrophysiological responses to auditorily presented
neutral and angry sentences found increased mismatch negativity
(MMN) amplitude in the ASD group compared to the control
group, suggesting that participants with ASD focused more on
the low-level acoustic characteristics of the utterances, in contrast
to typical group which was processing the stimuli in a more
global way. Additionally, there were differences between group
in terms of lateralization of the components. Typical children
showed larger N1 amplitudes over the right hemisphere and larger
late MMN amplitudes over the left hemisphere, but the ASD
group showed less lateralization for MMN and N1, with greatest
differences between groups over the right hemisphere (Korpilahti
et al., 2007). However, this study did not have a behavioral mea-
sure, thus it is difficult to make direct inferences from differences
in electrophysiological responses to the corresponding cognitive
processes.
In sum, the studies reviewed here demonstrate that subjects
with ASD have widespread impairments in processing emotional
language, and these impairments are present in tasks tapping
into different cognitive domains, in comprehension as well as
production tasks, and tasks of varying levels of complexity. These
impairments are also reflected in abnormal concomitant physio-
logical and neural responses.
SUMMARY
To summarize, individuals with ASD are able to correctly identify
words, sentences or stories as emotionally positive or negative
(Volden and Sorenson, 2009; Grossman et al., 2010; Brown et al.,
2012), but have difficulty with providing an in-depth explanation
(Bauminger, 2004; Rieffe et al., 2007). Implicit behavioral mea-
sures show more robust and consistent between-group differences
(compared to studies that use explicit behavioral measures). The
overall tendency is that subjects with ASD have a poorer mem-
ory for emotional events (Gaigg and Bowler, 2008, 2009b), are
less inclined to direct attentional resources to emotional stimuli
(Korpilahti et al., 2007; Corden et al., 2008; Gaigg and Bowler,
2009a) and mention emotions in spontaneous conversations
(Capps et al., 2000; Barnes et al., 2009) than typically developing
participants. Studies of autonomic activity are very few in number
and show mixed results. In contrast, neuroimaging studies report
consistently diminished brain activation in response to emotional
stimuli in subjects with ASD compared to typical participants. At
least in studies using auditory stimuli, the brain activity results
suggest that participants with ASD are more likely to focus on
phonological features of the input rather than process it in the
holistic manner, as we hypothesized in Section Explicit vs. Implicit
Measures (Korpilahti et al., 2007; Hesling et al., 2010). However,
only a small number of studies investigated brain activity (1 study
with EEG and 5 studies with fMRI), therefore more studies are
required before we can draw more firm conclusions.
It was shown that high-functioning subjects with ASD are able
to interpret others’ emotional behavior correctly and react with an
appropriate emotional response if they are provided with explicit
cues, in spite of their problems with spontaneous emotional
interactions (Begeer et al., 2008). There are two alternative expla-
nations for the discrepancy between absent spontaneously applied
and relatively intact cue-related emotional skills and responses in
ASD. One option is that individuals with ASD have adequate and
typical conceptual representations of emotions, but have trouble
applying them in real life. The alternative explanation is that the
emotion concepts of ASD individuals are actually different from
typical individuals and are more similar to neutral concepts. The
evidence from the behavioral studies of attention and memory
(Beversdorf et al., 1998; Corden et al., 2008; Gaigg and Bowler,
2008, 2009a,b) points towards the latter alternative, and the few
available neuroimaging studies suggest that individuals with ASD
largely recruit the same neural networks for processing emotional
and neutral language (Kennedy et al., 2006; Hesling et al., 2010).
However, this is only a preliminary conclusion that needs to be
backed up by more research, particularly on autonomic activity
and electrophysiology.
EMOTIONAL LANGUAGE IMPAIRMENT AND GENERAL
INTELLIGENCE
About half to two-third of people with ASD also have some
form of intellectual disability (Matson and Shoemaker, 2009).
Language impairment in ASD has a more complex pattern.
Higher order linguistic functions, such as semantics and pragmat-
ics (understanding contextual and non-literal meaning, inferring
speaker intentions) are almost universally impaired in ASD, while
phonology, lexicon and syntax are affected to varying degrees in
different subgroups (Groen et al., 2008; Eigsti et al., 2011). Some
researchers also report more deficits in language comprehension
than in production (Hudry et al., 2010a). In the following part we
will discuss the link between impairment in emotional language
processing and (1) history of language delay; (2) presence of
intellectual disability; and (3) individual differences in verbal and
nonverbal IQ within normal range.
ARE IMPAIRMENTS IN EMOTIONAL LANGUAGE RELATED TO
LANGUAGE DELAY?
By the definition of the DSM-IV criteria, subjects with Asperger
have normal milestones for language acquisition in the first years
after birth (APA, 2000). If emotional impairments in ASD are
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in part due to a delay in language acquisition, we would expect
that studies including subjects with Asperger syndrome would
more often report negative results, in other words find less of
even no differences between the control and patient group on
emotional language measures. However, this appears not to be the
case. Individuals with Asperger syndrome have serious problems
in talking about social-emotional topics (Adams et al., 2002).
Furthermore, they have an abnormal Event-Related Potentials
(ERP) pattern when hearing angry intonation (Korpilahti et al.,
2007), fail to show modulation of attention blink effect by emo-
tional content of the words (Corden et al., 2008), and show a
different pattern of pupillary response when hearing emotional
sentences (Kuchinke et al., 2011). In all these aspects of emotion
processing, subjects with Asperger syndrome differ from controls,
despite their rather intact early language skills and absence of
language delay. Therefore, their impairment in emotional lan-
guage cannot be explained by developmental delay in language
and communication. However, none of the studies compared a
group of participants with Asperger syndrome to a group with
autism and language delay within the same paradigm. Therefore,
the question remains whether individuals with classic autism
who frequently have early language delays, would demonstrate a
greater degree of emotion language impairment under the same
task conditions.
If the overall level of language development is a decisive
factor for the normal development of emotional competence and
processing of emotional stimuli, emotional language impairments
should also diminish or even disappear when people with ASD
catch up in their language development with their peers. How-
ever, this does not appear to be the case, since the emotional
impairments do not disappear when the participants become
older and acquire better language skills. The participants in the
studies ranged from 3-year-old children to adolescents and adults,
and differences in emotional language processing occurred in
subjects with ASD in all age groups. Furthermore, although high-
functioning individuals with ASD, and thus without language
delay, from various age groups were able to provide adequate
explicit evaluations of emotional stimuli, they showed atypical
performance compared to control subjects on measures of mem-
ory performance, attention, and autonomic activity in relation to
the processing of emotional language stimuli. The cause of the
absence of behavioral differences in some tasks remains an open
question, but one likely explanation is that high-functioning ASD
subjects develop compensatory strategies by explicitly learning the
relation between a situation and an emotional label (Begeer et al.,
2008; see also Hobson, 1991).
Comparison of the results to a non-emotional task of similar
difficulty can also help to address the issue of whether or not
emotional language difficulties in ASD are a consequence of more
general language delay. Several studies have used such control
tasks. They found that the atypical performance in the ASD par-
ticipants was relatively specific to emotional stimuli, and did not
extend to other semantic features of the verbal materials: namely
semantic relatedness (Gaigg and Bowler, 2008), distinctiveness
of individual words (Corden et al., 2008; Gaigg and Bowler,
2009a), or the conceptual content of sentences (Beversdorf et al.,
1998).
ARE IMPAIRMENTS IN EMOTIONAL LANGUAGE RELATED TO THE
PRESENCE OF INTELLECTUAL DISABILITY?
The next question is whether the emotional impairments are
related to the presence of general intellectual disability. If so,
emotional impairments should show a different degree of severity
in individuals with ASD with high and low IQ. One possibility is
that individuals with ASD and intellectual disability would show
a greater degree of emotional impairment. Most of the studies we
identified tested individuals with normal or above normal intel-
ligence, and only 8 studies included a sample of low-functioning
subjects (Hobson and Lee, 1989; Boucher et al., 2000; Capps et al.,
2000; Hillier and Allinson, 2002; Pearlman-Avnion and Eviatar,
2002; Williams and Happé, 2010). It is difficult and even problem-
atic to estimate whether and how emotional language stimuli are
processed in low-functioning subjects with ASD, because more
complex tasks can’t be administered in this population. Further,
the problems specific to emotional information add up with
problems in understanding the instruction and performing the
task in general. Thus, in more difficult tasks specific difficulties
with emotion processing may be obscured, for instance, by the
effects of shorter attention span, poor understanding of the
task, tendency for impulsivity, or response perseveration. Simpler
tasks, on the other hand, may lead to ceiling effects in both
groups.
Notwithstanding these methodological problems, some stud-
ies reported that low-functioning individuals with ASD per-
formed worse on emotion language task than mental age-
matched healthy controls (Rieffe et al., 2007). In contrast,
other studies found that low functioning ASD subjects per-
formed equally (Capps et al., 2000; Williams and Happé,
2010) or even better (Boucher et al., 2000) than children
with a linguistic or intellectual impairment. These discrepant
findings could reflect differences in emotional skills between
the groups, but could also be due to the task demands
being too high, particularly for the children with an intel-
lectual disability. This confound makes it difficult to deter-
mine whether the emotional language impairment is due to
a specific emotional deficit or to suboptimal general cognitive
skills.
Additionally, it is also possible that individuals with ASD with
extremely high IQ would also show greater degree of emotional
impairment compared to people with average IQ. Other domains,
such as restricted and repetitive behaviors, were previously shown
to have such complex association with IQ (Bishop et al., 2006).
None of the studies included in our review specifically looked
at a subgroup of people with ASD with extremely high IQ,
although the reported variance of IQ scores suggests that at least
a few of their participants had IQ scores in the extremely high
range.
So far, the issue of whether emotional language impairments
are present to a similar degree in individuals with ASD with
varying levels of IQ has not been fully explored. A possible design
is to include three groups of subjects with ASD (functioning in
the low, middle and superior range of intelligence) and three age
and IQ matched non-ASD control groups, and examine whether
any discrepancies on emotional language tasks between ASD and
matched controls would vary systematically as a function of IQ.
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ARE IMPAIRMENTS IN EMOTIONAL LANGUAGE RELATED TO
VARIATION IN GENERAL INTELLIGENCE?
Another way to explore the dependance of emotional impair-
ments on IQ differences is to directly calculate the within-group
correlation between the performance in the experiment and IQ.
If the variation in IQ would matter and would be causally linked
to the task performance, we would expect the verbal or nonverbal
IQ to negatively correlate with the degree of emotional language
impairment within the ASD group. This was examined in seven
studies. Three studies found a positive correlation between
performance on emotional task and verbal IQ (Gaigg and Bowler,
2009a; Williams and Happé, 2010; Siller et al., 2014), and in three
studies the correlation was not significant (Hillier and Allinson,
2002; Lindner and Rosén, 2006; Losh and Capps, 2006). Two
studies reported correlations with nonverbal abilities; one study
found a significant positive correlation (Hillier and Allinson,
2002), while the other study reported a nonsignificant relation-
ship (Losh and Capps, 2006). Finally, two studies did not look
separately at verbal and nonverbal components: one study found
a significant positive relationship with mental age (Bauminger,
2004), while the other study found no association with IQ (Han
et al., 2014). Because of the small number of studies, it is hard to
reach a definite conclusion on whether IQ plays a significant role
in performance. However, the fact that only half of the studies
found an effect of IQ while the other half found no effect suggests
that even if the effect is there, it must be rather weak. Finally,
in case of the studies that do not report any data on association
between IQ and their measures of interest, it is not clear whether
those studies did not investigate the effect of IQ, or whether
they found a statistically nonsignificant effect and decided not
to report it. A general recommendation for future studies would
be to report the relationship between IQ and the outcome of
interest, even if this relationship is not statistically significant.
In summary, from these data we can conclude that language
delay, presence of intellectual disability or variation in general
intelligence cannot fully explain impairments in the processing
of emotional language in subjects with ASD. In fact, there is
more evidence for impairments of emotion language in high-
functioning subjects with ASD and in subjects with Asperger,
when compared to appropriate matched control subjects, than
in low-functioning subjects with ASD. Nonetheless, variation in
general intelligence still plays a role to some degree, although not
in all types of tasks, and not with all types of stimuli. The extent
to which IQ differences influence emotional language processing
remains an open issue that merits further study.
CONSEQUENCES OF EMOTIONAL LANGUAGE IMPAIRMENTS
FOR OUR UNDERSTANDING OF ASD
So far we have concluded that emotional language impairments in
ASD are widespread and not restricted to any particular cognitive
domain or stimulus type; they are even more pronounced in
subjects with high-functioning autism and Asperger syndrome
than in individuals with intellectual disability, language problems
or language delay; and they persist through all age groups. These
emotional language impairments complement the emotional
impairments for the recognition, processing, understanding and
production of facial and visual displays of emotions, which have
been reviewed extensively by others (Jemel et al., 2006; Harms
et al., 2010). In this next section, we will discuss whether and how
these widespread and rather general emotional impairments can
be accounted for by existing cognitive theories of autism.
EMOTIONS AND GLOBAL VS. LOCAL PROCESSING
The central coherence account proposes that autism is charac-
terized by a particular cognitive style of information process-
ing, which can be described as detail-oriented, with particular
attention paid to separate parts or aspects of an object (Happé,
2005; Happé and Frith, 2006). In contrast, typical individuals
have a strong preference for global processing and integration,
also known as central coherence. The evidence supporting the
deficit in central coherence in ASD comes from a wide range of
studies, including different kinds of visual and semantic tasks
(Happé, 2005). However, this theory was developed primarily
to explain the pattern of cognitive strengths and weaknesses in
autism, and it was not intended to explain the emotional and
social-communicative impairments of subjects with ASD.
Weak central coherence seems to explain only part of the
evidence with regard to emotional impairments reviewed above.
The emotional meaning of an image, a musical piece, or a text
may not be evident from the details and only apparent when
the stimulus is processed as a whole and/or put into context. If
individuals with ASD indeed would miss the emotional meaning
of a stimulus because of weak central coherence skills, this would
be evident in their explicit evaluation of the stimuli. However,
this is not the case; in fact, several studies demonstrated that
subjects with ASD could correctly classify spoken sentences as
emotionally positive or negative (Volden and Sorenson, 2009;
Grossman et al., 2010; Kuchinke et al., 2011), and also provided
similar rating of emotional arousal of emotion words as the
control group (Corden et al., 2008; Gaigg and Bowler, 2008).
Additionally, according to the central coherence account, more
complex stimuli (text, stories) would be problematic to subjects
with ASD while more simple stimuli such as single words would
not be. However, a number of studies found group differences
when using single words (Corden et al., 2008; Gaigg and Bowler,
2008, 2009a,b). Finally, if individuals with ASD would be unable
to quickly grasp the emotional meaning of a stimulus, we would
expect that the neural or autonomic responses to emotional
stimuli would not differ from neutral stimuli. However, several
studies found that startle potentiation in ASD subjects differs
not between positive and negative stimuli, but between these and
neutral stimuli, which means that the emotional stimuli do have
an effect, but are processed in an atypical way (Wilbarger et al.,
2009; Dichter et al., 2010).
There have also been attempts to integrate social-
communicative impairments into the central coherence account,
by arguing that integrative and holistic processing is essential for
social cognition and Theory of Mind skills (Happé, 1997; Jarrold
et al., 2000). However, some studies reported that individuals with
ASD who pass the Theory of Mind task and those who fail have
a similar lack of central coherence performance. This supports
the notion that central coherence and theory of mind deficits are
independent (Happé, 1997, 2000). Additionally, it is still debated
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whether central coherence in ASD is weak or deficient, or just
unused, because under some task conditions subjects with ASD
are able to display holistic processing (Happé and Frith, 2006).
An alternative to the Weak Central Coherence account is the
Enhanced Perceptual Functioning (EPF) model (Mottron and
Burack, 2001; Mottron et al., 2006). This model proposes that
individuals with ASD are not impaired at global processing, but
they are better at processing details. As a consequence, sponta-
neously they choose a more detail-oriented processing style, even
though they are able to focus on the global picture when they
are explicitly instructed to do so. According to the EPF model,
focusing on the perceptual aspects and ignoring the conceptual
aspects of the stimuli could lead to a relative lack of processing
emotional information. This would explain why participants with
ASD would utilize emotional information in some tasks but not
in others (Gaigg and Bowler, 2008; South et al., 2008). Future
studies need to address this issue, for example, by considering
whether a focus on different levels of processing (e.g., superficial
perceptual feature analysis or deep semantic analysis) may explain
the difference in processing emotion by ASD and typical groups.
EMOTIONS AND EXECUTIVE DYSFUNCTION
Another influential theory proposes that the executive dysfunc-
tion is at the core of ASD (Ozonoff et al., 2005). Executive
function is a broad term that refers to a group of cognitive func-
tions that include monitoring of one’s own behavior, cognitive
control, flexibility, inhibition, planning and working memory
(Eslinger, 1996). Deficits in various aspects of executive function
are observed not only in ASD, but also in many other psychiatric
disorders, such as ADHD (Willcutt et al., 2005). Problems in
executive function in ASD are especially evident for cognitive
flexibility, with inhibitory control and working memory being less
affected (Ozonoff et al., 2005).
Research has suggested a link between executive function-
ing and the processing of emotions (Pessoa, 2009). Research in
other clinical populations found that executive control measures
correlate with performance in tasks tapping into emotional and
motivational systems in schizophrenia (Lee et al., 2009), measures
of cognitive control correlate with mood in patients with trau-
matic brain injury (McDonald et al., 2010), and cognitive flex-
ibility and response inhibition correlate with empathy measures
in depressed patients (Thoma et al., 2011). However, emotions
and executive functions are thought to be rather separate sys-
tems that rely on different brain networks (Seeley et al., 2007).
Furthermore, while mood state and emotional significance of
the stimuli can certainly have an effect on executive function
(Pessoa, 2009; Mueller, 2011), there is no evidence that executive
functioning by itself has major effects on emotion processing, in
particular on fast stimulus-driven responses (Corden et al., 2008;
Gaigg and Bowler, 2009a) and autonomic activity (Kuchinke
et al., 2011). Therefore, deficits in executive functioning are
not a sufficient explanation for the emotional impairments in
ASD.
EMOTIONS AND THEORY OF MIND
The development of emotion understanding is tightly linked to
the development of social relationships and the accumulation
of experience in interaction with others. One of the influential
cognitive models of ASD is the Theory of Mind account. It
assumes that people normally develop an ability to attribute
mental states to themselves and to other people (Leudar et al.,
2004; Sodian and Kristen, 2010). This ability is also called Theory
of Mind reasoning or mentalizing. Mentalizing is required to
reason about thoughts and desires of people, infer their feelings
and beliefs, and predict their actions. People with ASD have
problems in attributing mental states to themselves or to other
people (Yirmiya et al., 1992; Lombardo et al., 2007; Jones et al.,
2010; Schulte-Rüther et al., 2011). Reasoning about other people’s
emotions is also a part of Theory of Mind abilities. Therefore,
problems in deriving emotional meaning from text, describing
one’s emotional state, and explaining why one should feel sad or
happy might rely on general Theory of Mind ability.
However, differences in emotional awareness in subjects with
ASD were found to be independent from impairments in self-
reflecting and mentalizing skills (Buitelaar et al., 1999; Silani et al.,
2008). Furthermore, while emotions play an important role in
social interactions, they are not limited to social phenomena and
fulfill important additional psychological functions. For example,
emotions play a role in detecting potentially important threaten-
ing or pleasant stimuli and triggering an appropriate approach or
avoidance behavioral response. Some of the studies dealing with
fast automatic responses to motivationally relevant stimuli (angry
voice, scary, or pleasant pictures) tapped into this aspect of emo-
tions (Dichter et al., 2010; Kuchinke et al., 2011). Those responses
are very fast and bottom-up in nature, and involve a person’s own
affective reaction rather than an explicit reflection on his or her
own mental state. Those abnormal automatic emotional reactions
thus cannot be readily and completely explained by a Theory of
Mind deficit.
EMOTIONS AND ALEXITHYMIA
Recent studies suggest a link between ASD and alexithymia
(Silani et al., 2008; Bird et al., 2011). Alexithymia is defined as
a difficulty in identifying and describing one’s own feelings and
difficulty in distinguishing one’s feelings from bodily sensations
of emotional arousal (Nemiah, 1977). Alexithymia is thought
to characterize about 10% of the general population (Linden
et al., 1995; Salminen et al., 1999). Although alexithymia is
neither a necessary nor a sufficient feature of ASD, it is present
in approximately 50% of individuals with ASD (Hill et al.,
2004; Berthoz and Hill, 2005; Lombardo et al., 2007). Alex-
ithymia is typically assessed based on self-report questionnaires
such as TAS-20 (Bagby et al., 1994). The key question here is
whether the emotional deficits of subjects with ASD described
above are linked to alexithymia (Silani et al., 2008; Bird et al.,
2010).
There is evidence that the empathy deficits reported in
ASD are indeed related to alexithymia. Subjects with ASD
who were not alexithymic demonstrated normal empathic
responses, but individuals with ASD and alexithymia showed
clear empathy deficits (Bird et al., 2011). The alexithymia
account fits with the problems in understanding emotions in
text, images, and music. Some studies report that subjects
with ASD were able to adequately rate the stimuli on their
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emotional valence (Corden et al., 2008), which at first glance
seems to be contradicting the findings from alexithymia stud-
ies. However, the scale used in these studies was rather simple
and asked only for a differentiation of positive and negative
valence.
Introspection into one’s own inner state is a rather com-
plex skill that only develops in childhood (Flavell et al., 2000),
but the first symptoms of autism are often apparent before
that. Therefore, it is likely that instead of being a cause, both
alexithymia and a lack of empathy in ASD arise as a conse-
quence of impaired emotional processing. For example, some
studies report that automatic reflexive responses in ASD do not
differentiate between positive and negative valence (Wilbarger
et al., 2009; Dichter et al., 2010). These low-level processing
abnormalities may give rise to a general problem with identi-
fying and categorizing emotional states in other persons and
in oneself. Further studies are needed to examine whether
alexithymia is a useful construct to subtype subjects with
ASD and to examine the underlying physiological and neu-
ral mechanisms of impaired emotion processing and empathy
deficits.
EMOTIONS AND MOTIVATION: REWARD AND PUNISHMENT LEARNING
As described earlier, emotions are linked to evaluation of the
motivational significance of an object or event and to the moti-
vational system in general (Frijda, 2010; Mesquita and Frijda,
2011). Altered sensitivity to reward would lead to a difficulty
in estimating the motivational saliency of the stimuli and hence
their emotional meaning. Studies of motivation and processing of
reward and punishment in ASD are scarce; however, available data
suggest deficits in the processing of reward (Scott-Van Zeeland
et al., 2010; Kohls et al., 2011). For example, children with ASD
performed abnormally on a delayed non-match to sample task.
In this task, a stimulus which is not associated with reward in the
current trial will be the one associated with reward in the next
trial. Children with ASD had trouble learning stimulus-reward
associations and flexibly adjusting them in the course of the task
(Dawson et al., 2001). Several neuroimaging studies investigating
social (smiling face) and nonsocial (monetary) rewards in sub-
jects with ASD found diminished activations in neural networks
associated with processing of reward and punishment: nucleus
accumbens (NA; Dichter et al., 2012b; Kohls et al., 2013), ACC
(Scott-Van Zeeland et al., 2010; Kohls et al., 2013) and striatum
(Scott-Van Zeeland et al., 2010). Additionally, neural response
to reward in the left ACC was found to correlate with measures
of social interaction abilities in the ASD group (Schmitz et al.,
2008).
Another fMRI study used two reward conditions, one con-
sisting of monetary reward, and the other consisting of objects
that are typically interesting and relevant for ASD individu-
als: machines, trains, electronic devices. Control group showed
significantly greater activation of the NA in the monetary reward
condition, while in the ASD group the NA activity was not
significantly different in the two conditions, and not significantly
different from the control group in the object reward condi-
tion (Dichter et al., 2012a). This result suggests an impairment
in the reward processing system in the ASD group, including
a diminished anticipation of reward and a lower salience of
reward in general. An impairment in reward processing was
also found in an ERP study using a different paradigm, where
subjects with ASD demonstrated an attenuated P3 component
during reward anticipation in response to cues associated with
both social and monetary reward (Kohls et al., 2011), suggesting
hyporesponsivity to reward in the ASD group and reduced atten-
tion allocation to incentive stimuli. However, another EEG study
examined a different ERP component (namely, feedback related
negativity) and reported no difference between ASD and control
groups for positive compared to negative feedback (Larson et al.,
2011). This suggests that the dysfunction in the motivational
system affects early stages (anticipation of the outcome) to a
greater degree compared to later stages (post-feedback process-
ing), and processing of rewards to a greater degree compared to
losses.
In all, these data indicate that subjects with ASD are less
sensitive to social and nonsocial rewards, as reflected in lower
activations of the reward areas of the brain, and even may react
with distress to reward given increased activity of the amygdala
and insular cortex (Dichter et al., 2012b). The question of whether
problems in motivation and sensitivity to reward cause problems
in emotions, or, instead, deficient emotional responses lead to
problems in motivation, is not fully clear yet. The link between
motivational processes and processing of emotional stimuli in
ASD needs to be studied further.
EMOTION, SIMULATION, AND THE MIRROR NEURON SYSTEM
Embodied simulation theory states that people understand other
people’s actions by directly simulating them (instead of logi-
cally inferring their intentions through metacognitive reasoning;
Gallese, 2007; Gallese and Sinigaglia, 2011). They do so by acti-
vating the same brain networks which would also be activated if
the observer would be performing the same action. For example,
when one observes other people’s actions, a pattern of motor
activity is activated that corresponds to the neural pattern of
when the observer would perform the same action. According
to the simulation theory, this MNS plays an important role
in understanding and predicting actions of other people in a
rather direct way and without necessarily involving more indi-
rect mentalizing skills. Recently, it has been proposed that our
brain simulates not only actions, but also emotions of others
(Decety and Jackson, 2004; Keysers and Gazzola, 2006) and in
this way facilitates understanding others’ inner emotional states
(Perry et al., 2010; Sinigaglia and Sparaci, 2010). Observing other
people’s facial expressions is associated with increased activity in
regions of the inferior precentral and inferior frontal gyri that
are also involved in producing similar expressions (Carr et al.,
2003). This activity is thought to trigger congruent activity in
emotional brain regions such as the insula and the amygdala
(Carr et al., 2003; Jabbi and Keysers, 2008). Activity in the
frontal parts of the MNS was found to be associated with the
tendency to empathize with other individuals (Gazzola et al.,
2006; Jabbi et al., 2007; Saarela et al., 2007; Pfeifer et al., 2008).
On the reverse, lesions of this area were associated with deficits
in empathy and emotion recognition (Shamay-Tsoory et al.,
2009).
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A “broken MNS” hypothesis could explain both the social
and emotional impairments in ASD (Iacoboni and Dapretto,
2006). This hypothesis is supported by data from behavioral
studies and a variety of structural and functional abnormalities
found in the MNS region (Dapretto et al., 2005; Hadjikhani
et al., 2006). However, recent evidence shows that under different
task conditions MNS in autism seems to be intact (Hamilton
et al., 2007). Overall, the empirical evidence for the broken
mirror hypothesis of ASD is rather mixed and includes a num-
ber of studies yielding disconfirming evidence (Hamilton et al.,
2007).
It is possible that the abnormal functioning of the MNS
observed in the early studies is caused by a deficit outside the
MNS. Some authors suggested that the MNS is not dysfunctional
on its own, but that motivational abnormalities draw the child’s
attention away from social and towards idiosyncratic stimuli. As
a result, the MNS does not receive a proper input and therefore
does not develop fully (Esser et al., 2010). In a recent review, it was
further suggested that other neural systems besides MNS, such as
networks involved in attention and control, may be responsible
for the inconsistent findings with regard to imitation in ASD
(Kana et al., 2011).
CONCLUSIONS AND PERSPECTIVES
The results of our systematic review allow us to draw several
conclusions. First, the data supports the existence of impairments
in the processing of emotional language in individuals with ASD
that are relatively independent of the complexity of stimuli (single
words, sentences or discourse), task (production or compre-
hension, recognition, recall or detection), and of the sensory
modality (visual or auditory). These impairments were found
in different tasks tapping in reasoning, memory, or attention
to emotional stimuli. The evidence for atypical physiological or
neural responses is limited due to a small number of studies.
Second, these emotional impairments have been documented
in ASD participants with average or even above average cognitive
abilities and appear to be rather independent of the level of
language development. Studies in low-functioning subjects with
ASD, however, are less well suited to differentiate specific prob-
lems in handling emotional stimuli from more general emotional
deficits due to cognitive problems.
Third, the existence of impairments in emotional language
processing has implications for our understanding of the rela-
tionship between emotional and social deficits in ASD. In contrast
to more concrete stimuli such as faces, linguistic representations
of emotion are more abstract, and proficient understanding of
them is dependent on verbal ability and develops later compared
to reading expressions from faces or body postures (McClure,
2000; Adolphs, 2002). Emotional language can be used in a
context that does not involve interaction with another persons.
A person could know a word for a specific emotion without
having a good understanding of this emotion. For example,
people with amygdala lesion become impaired in the ability to
understand and recognize fear (Broks et al., 1998), but they
do not forget the word “fear” itself. Conversely, it’s also pos-
sible to understand another person’s inner state without hav-
ing a verbal label to describe this state. It seems reasonable to
hypothesize that a common emotional impairment may underlie
the impairments in both facial emotion processing and in emo-
tional language.
Fourth, we explored how well cognitive accounts of ASD may
explain the emotional impairments in ASD. Classic cognitive
theories of ASD, namely Theory of Mind, Executive Dysfunction
and Weak Central Coherence, have limited power to explain
emotional impairments in ASD. On the other hand, findings
from studies on reward and punishment learning offer a more
promising account of the emotional impairments. More work in
this area is warranted. Finally, alexithymia appears to be a useful
construct to subtype subjects with ASD, to examine its underlying
physiological and neural mechanisms and to link it to broader
aspects of emotional functioning in social interaction.
On a broader level, this review indicates that emotional
impairments in ASD should receive more attention from both
researchers and clinicians. Emotional impairments in ASD were
brought forward by Kanner already in his seminal description
in 1943, but since then have shifted to the background. In the
current classification systems DSM-5 and ICD-10, emotional
symptoms are regarded as part of, or as secondary to, prob-
lems in social interaction and communication. Bringing emo-
tional symptoms in ASD to the attention of researchers may
inform our understanding of ASD in several ways. We can
then establish whether emotional impairments are present across
the whole autism spectrum, are specific for ASD, or resemble
the deficits observed in other disorders such as schizophrenia
or anxiety disorders. Further, this will allow us to provide a
more detailed and accurate description of the clinical mani-
festations of ASD. This would facilitate identification of more
homogeneous subgroups and stimulate the study of emotional
competence of subjects with ASD within and outside the social
context and across various levels of structure of social con-
texts. Finally, this would increase investments in developing
and testing therapeutic interventions for emotional deficits in
ASD.
Emotional and social development are tightly linked to each
other. Many emotions, such as shame or embarrassment, are
social in nature, and displays of emotion are important ele-
ments of everyday social interactions. Trouble understanding the
emotions of other people can lead to great difficulties in social
functioning. The emotional aspects of social interaction received
considerable attention from researchers (Begeer et al., 2008).
However, ‘emotional’ and ‘social’ are not the same. Emotions
do not only have social, but also psychological and biological
components, are tightly related to the system of motivations and
needs (Frijda, 2008; Larsen et al., 2008; Mesquita and Frijda,
2011), and are responses to unconditional stimuli such as pain.
In turn, social interaction cannot be reduced to purely emo-
tional aspects. Various models of social interaction include cog-
nitive components, such as overt encoding and interpretation
of behavioral cues and selecting an appropriate response (Crick
and Dodge, 1994, 1996), and implicit cognition such as implicit
judgment biases and memory (Greenwald and Banaji, 1995;
Amodio and Ratner, 2011). Some authors suggest that simulation
is a crucial component of social cognition (Barsalou, 2008), and
that the MNS is the neural mechanism of simulation (Wolpert
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et al., 2003; Uddin et al., 2007). Proponents of this view claim
that the motor system is essential for social cognition (Gallese,
2007).
Social and emotional development are intertwined; social
interactions with other people and observation of their emotional
reactions are of the utmost importance for the development and
maturation of emotional competence. An impoverished pattern
of social experiences as in ASD will have its consequences for the
emotional development of an individual.
Are the observed emotional deficits in subjects with ASD
only a consequence of limited normal social experiences, or are
they present from the very start and do they contribute to the
abnormalities in social interaction? Recent reviews in this field
have already suggested that impairments of emotion processing
in ASD should not be viewed as a mere consequence of core
social deficits, but instead as a result of an interplay between
emotion and various cognitive processes as well as social devel-
opment (Gaigg, 2012; Nuske et al., 2013). The data on emotional
deficits in adolescents and adults with ASD indicate that these
are not limited to the context of social interaction, but also
found in tasks that do not directly rely on social interaction
or communication skills, such as memory and attention tasks.
However, there is still a possibility that these emotional deficits
have been ultimately caused by social deficits that affect the
development of the emotional competence and emotion under-
standing: Because a child with ASD is not able to establish
normal social contact, his/her knowledge and experience related
to emotions are also limited. One way to clarify this issue is
to investigate the development of reciprocal social interaction
and the amount of social experience along with the develop-
ment of emotional competence using a longitudinal design. Such
a study design would allow a disentanglement of the mutual
influence of social and emotional development. Unfortunately,
so far not enough developmental studies are available, and the
developmental course of this impairment needs further study.
Another approach is to compare the processing of emotion
in language to other language aspects that would equally rely
on social interaction and social understanding, and to test if
emotional language processing is impaired above and beyond
general semantic or pragmatic language processing. The stimuli
in the studies reviewed here are difficult to separate into social
vs. nonsocial types. One can rather speak about the degree to
which a task has a social component. For example, having a
structured interview or having to explain the meaning of a word
to the experimenter can be viewed as a more social task, while
listening to recorded speech is less social, and hearing or reading
word lists is even less social. None of the studies included in
this review manipulated social and emotional aspects of the task
independently, although several studies attempted to compare
social and emotional aspects of the stimuli (Hobson and Lee,
1989; Beversdorf et al., 1998).
The consideration of social and emotional functioning
as rather distinct but closely interacting domains during
development has implications for designing and performing lon-
gitudinal studies of subjects with ASD. These studies should assess
both social and emotional functioning and examine whether
and how social problems aggravate problems of emotional
functioning, and vice versa in healthy and ASD subjects. Further-
more, research should address whether subjects with ASD try to
compensate for their deficit in the processing of social or emo-
tional stimuli by using learned cognitive strategies. In addition, it
is important to disentangle the contributions of specific cognitive
functions to the problems in the emotional domain and in the
social domain to better understand the nature of the disorder and
to develop appropriate intervention strategies.
There is also an urgent need for translational cognitive and
neuroscience studies in ASD. These should bridge the gap between
sophisticated research into cognitive and neural mechanisms in
selected and rather small samples of ASD subjects, and observing
and analyzing social and emotional functioning in daily life in
larger and more representative groups of subjects with ASD.
The final test of prospective cognitive and neural markers of
ASD is their potential to improve our understanding of day-to-
day functioning and adaptation, and to form a basis for clinical
intervention and management.
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